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Truthlikeness Reject additivity 12.
The Upshot
Truthlikeness and Epistemic Utility
Accuracy is not a only pervasive notion but a central one. In our epistemic adventures we aspire to the whole truth of some matter, but we often fail to reach it. Not all need be in vain, however, if some attempts to capture the truth, while not completely accurate, are more accurate than others. Two different programs are in the business of trying to pin accuracy down-the truthlikeness (TL) program and the epistemic utility (EU) program. The former was inspired by
Not every answer to a question need be complete. That N is between seven and ten is an answer to I N , albeit an incomplete one. That it is hot is also an incomplete answer to I W , the weather question. Each incomplete answer is compatible with a range of complete answersand will be represented as a class or disjunction of such.
The simplest kind of credal state-simple belief in, or acceptance of, proposition A-can be represented by the object of that belief. At each stage of an inquiry some proposition A is the strongest answer to the question that is accepted. The course of an inquiry is a path through the space of possible answers. The task of the TL program is to specify when a step in an inquiry constitutes progress towards the truth.
Accuracy For Propositions
Let I = {C 1, C2, …} be some question. We are after an accuracy ordering ≿ on the set of answers incomparable, but for an account to be materially adequate it must at least deliver the intuitively compelling comparisons.
Popper was the first to attempt a general definition of ≿. Where Ci is true, let Tri(A) be the true answers entailed by A and Fa i(A) the set of false answers entailed by A. Popper's proposal is this: A≿ i B =df Tri(B)⊆Tri(A) and Fai(A)⊆Fai(B). It follows that A≻ i B if A≿ i B and one of these inclusions is strict. Unfortunately, for false A and B, if Tri(B)⊆Tri(A) then not

Fa i(A)⊂Fai(B), and if Fai(A)⊆Fai(B) then not Tri(B)⊂Tri(A). So Popper's account deems no
falsehood more accurate than any other. This trivialization of the concept of truthlikeness is not 4 only counterintuitive (some falsehoods seem more accurate than others), but it undermines
Popper's explicit aim of vindicating the possibility of progress through a series of falsehoods.
In contrast to Popper's very gappy proposal there are rival proposals that yield complete orderings. Suppose we have a natural candidate for a measure of distance, δ, between cells of I={C1, C2, …}: δij is the distance between Ci and Cj. Such a measure gives us an accuracy ordering for the complete answers at least: Cj≿ i Ck just in case δji ≤δki. For some inquiries a plausible δ is rather obvious. The distance between cells Ni and Nj of the partition I N is naturally taken to be the distance between the values they assign to magnitude N: δij=|i−j|. In other cases distances between cells can be naturally constructed. The weather question involves two 0-1 factors. The cells of I W are couples of 0s and 1s. Assuming the two weather factors are
If A and B are false neither condition holds. One cannot add truths to a false theory without adding 4 falsehoods, or remove falsehoods without removing truths (Tichý [1974] and Miller [1974] ).
equally weighty, one measure of distance-the city block measure-is given by the number of disagreements between them. Some atomic states may more weight than others. Such asymmetries are quite possible but there is nothing to prevent incorporating different weightings. Perhaps the temperature factor counts twice as much as the precipitation factor in accuracy assessments. In that case, the distance of ¬h∧r from h∧r would be twice that of the distance of h∧¬r from h∧r.
Figure 1: The weather space
Suppose, then, that we have an accuracy ordering ≳ of the complete answers, whether or not it derives from a distance measure δ. What we want is an accuracy ordering of the incomplete answers as well. We need to extend ≳ to the incomplete answers.
I W has four complete answers and eleven incomplete answers, each of which equivalent to a disjunction of complete answers. 5 Table 2 : Complete and incomplete answers to the weather question There are various proposals for extending a measure of distance δ or an ordering ≳ from the cells to the incomplete answers. The simplest deem the inaccuracy of proposition A to be determined in the obvious way by some representative A-cell: such as the A-cell closest to Ci (min) or the Acell furthest from Ci (max). min and max rank some false propositions, and they both rank 6 some correctly, but they are crude. min deems all truths to be equidistant from the truth (the tautology is no less accurate than the whole truth). max corrects this, but at the cost of deeming no false theory less accurate than the tautology. Clearly a single representative A-cell won't do.
Averaging min and max (min-max) might suggest itself. But why privilege just two A-cells?
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Why not take the distances of all A-cells into account? We could do that by averaging (ave). 8 This gets a lot but it doesn't deliver a principle highly favored by Popper-the value of content for truths-that the logically stronger of two truths is closer to the truth. One extension that 9 strongly penalizes weakening is the sum of distances of A-cells from the true cell (sum). sum
The contradiction, which rules out all cells, is on this characterization, no answer at all. min is proposed by Weston [1992] and Teller [2001] . 6 Hilpinen [1976] proposed a qualitative version and Niiniluoto [1987] proposed the numerical version. 7 Tichý [1974] and Oddie [2013] . 8 This has been considered sufficient grounds by some to reject ave. For a defense, see Oddie [2013] . 9 yields the value of content for truths but also delivers the value of content for falsehoods-that the stronger of two falsehoods is closer to the truth. That is as counterintuitive as it gets. We can mitigate this by incorporating a factor sensitive to proximity to the true cell (min, say). Taking a suitably weighted average of min and sum (call it min-sum) yields the value of content for truths without entailing the value of content for falsehoods. While strengthening a falsehood 10 decreases sum it can also increase min, by eliminating closest cells. A different measure is based on the symmetric difference operation Δ on classes of cells. Let sym be P(AΔCi) where P is a 11 normalized measure of the size of A. For propositions with the same truth value sym, like sum, diminishes with increasing logical content, delivering the value of content for falsehoods as well as truths. Like sum, sym can also be ameliorated by averaging with min (min-sym). 12 This overview is not exhaustive-we could consider other mixtures, like min-sum-maxbut already this may give the impression that accuracy principles are all just too contested for there to be any coherent notion of propositional accuracy. This would be a mistake. Not all principles of propositional accuracy are contested. Below I give a couple of compelling desiderata which together I call Strict Proximity.
One last caveat. The desiderata proposed apply with equal force to any qualitative accuracy ordering, partial or complete, whether or not it is derived from a distance measure. All we really need in what follows it that there is at least one question with four complete answers that bear the accuracy relations to one another exhibited in Figure 1 .
Proximity
The accuracy of A depends on the accuracy of the A-cells. Other things being equal, the more accurate the A-cells are, the more accurate A is. This underwrites two principles, one governing propositions of different logical strength and the other governing propositions of the same logical strength. Let Closesti(A) be the set of most accurate A-cells. Table 3 lists some examples: A striking example of Weak Proximity is worth noting. Where T is the truth, ¬T is the weakest falsehood on offer (Figure 2 ). If there is anything to the idea of propositional accuracy it is that that the cells in ¬T closest to the truth are not further from the truth than ¬T. (ii) (A1∨A2) is the result of substituting A1 for A4 in (A2∨A4).
Let Cj and Ck be equally accurate. Then the substitution of Ck for Cj neither decreases nor increases accuracy: A k/j and A are equally accurate. Suppose that Ck is more accurate than Cj.
Then the substitution of Ck for Cj clearly improves accuracy.
We thus have: 
Intuitively, however, A1 is more accurate than (A1∨A4). But by Weak Proximity:
Since by Substitution A2≻ 1 A4 yields (A1 ∨A2)≻ 1 (A1∨A4), Strict Proximity yields A1≻ 1 (A1∨A4).
Accuracy For Credal States
Not all credal states consist in the acceptance of propositions and not all developments in an inquiry are best represented by changes in propositions accepted. Suppose one begins an inquiry ignorant as to which cell of a partition contains the actual world. After gathering evidence (by tapping the barometer say) it may be that no particular cell is definitively ruled out, but that uncertainty is reduced. Some cells now seem more likely than others. Even though no new proposition has been accepted, one's credal state has changed, and such a change may constitute progress towards the truth.
Credal states can be represented as probability distributions over the cells of the inquiry.
The aim of the inquiry is to end up embracing the perfectly accurate probability distribution over The EU vindication of probabilism relies on the following claims: Pettigrew [2015] p. 2 dates this development to Oddie [1997] and Joyce [1998] . I argue for the the following conditional:
(2) If probabilism is true no legitimate measure of the accuracy of credal states satisfies S.
It follows from (1a) and (2) that no measure satisfying S is a legitimate measure of accuracy, depriving the vindication of probabilism of premise (1b). I assume the antecedent of (2) and demonstrate the consequent.
Like EU theorists, I am interested in the accuracy value simpliciter of credal states. There may be evaluable aspects of an inquiry that are not built into an inquirer's credal state at a time. Her current state might have been arrived at through wishful thinking, logical errors, dumb luck, or by judicious modification in the light of new evidence. These different epistemic procedures may differ in their cognitive value, as may the various epistemic trajectories they engender. As elsewhere, the value of a journey may diverge from the value of its destination.
I begin with plausible conditions on accuracy that EU theorists have found compelling.
The conjunction of these principles I dub the Core of the EU program. 15 Suppose Ci is true. Then P i 's assignments of probabilities match the truth values of all answers: P i (A)=1 if A is true, P i (A)=0 if A is false. Any other credal state P, whether opinionated or not, assigns different values to some of the answers. P(A) can be thought of as a more or less accurate estimate of the truth value of A, or of P i (A). The closer an estimate of a magnitude is to the actual value of the magnitude, the more accurate the estimate. So P is more accurate than Q
with respect to A if P(A) is closer to P i (A) than is Q(A). A local inaccuracy measure d(p,t) is thus
a function of p (the probability P assigns to A) and t (the truth value of A), satisfying:
Truth Directedness For all p∈[0,1], d(p,1) is a strictly decreasing function of p and d(p,0) is a strictly increasing function of p.
Any increasing function of the absolute difference |t−p| satisfies Truth Directedness, and the simplest is |t−p|itself (α 1 ). α 1 seems natural enough, but any exponential function of |t−p|is also truth directed: α z (p,t) = |t−p| z for z>0. Of course, many other functions satisfy the 16 constraint-like this logarithmic measure:
The Core is not inviolable. If it leads to counterintuitive results then there will be reason to tweak it.
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Absolute difference, α 1 , has been proposed by Horwich [1982] , Goldman [1999] and Maher [2002] .
These functions all have a property that arguably every inaccuracy measure should have. If local accuracy depends only on truth value and probability then since, in a coherent believer, believing A to degree p just is believing ¬A to degree (1−p), the inaccuracy of believing A to degree p should be the same as the inaccuracy of believing ¬A to degree (1−p).
Symmetry
For all p and t: d(p,1) = d(1−p,0). 17
Symmetry is not always assumed at the outset in EU vindications of probabilism, for the reason that credal states are not assumed at the outset to be probabilistic. (This is what they want to prove.) For non-probabilistic states the justification for Symmetry above would break down. But given that we are assuming probabilism for the purposes of establishing (2) above, Symmetry seems irresistible.
By Truth Directedness, P is minimally inaccurate with respect to A if and only if P(A)=P i (A). Minimal inaccuracy is naturally taken to be zero inaccuracy-a harmless scaling convention-so d(0,0)=d(1,1)=0. Another feature of the exponential functions, though not the logarithmic function, is that inaccuracy possesses a finite upper bound for 0≤p≤1. Again, setting the upper bound at 1 is a scaling convention, but it is by no means a mere convention to set an upper bound on inaccuracy. Some have endorsed unbounded measures, like the logarithmic function. For ease of exposition I collapse the two assumptions here but we will revisit that: Boundedness 0 is the greatest lower bound on inaccuracy and if and only if |t−p|= 0.
1 is the least upper bound on inaccuracy and if and only if|t−p|= 1.
Let Di(P) be the global inaccuracy of P given Ci. A plausible assumption is that Di(P) is an increasing function of local inaccuracies. If Di(P) were the simple sum of local inaccuracies this would clearly be satisfied. But perhaps summing is too simplistic. It treats all answers as equally important, and some answers might be more important to overall accuracy than others. Let λj be a weight assigned to answer Aj (in some enumeration of all answers) in the evaluation of the inaccuracy of P. The more important it is to get Aj right, the more P's error with respect to Aj counts in overall global inaccuracy. Not every assignment of weights is admissible-about which a lot more will be said-but the basic proposal is that the global inaccuracy of a credal state is the weighted sum of local inaccuracies, using some admissible λ-assignment:
Additivity
Global inaccuracy is the λ-weighted sum of local inaccuracies: When is λ admissible? Getting a particular answer wrong cannot uniformly enhance global accuracy. So all admissible λ-assignments have to be non-negative. Further, if all answers were assigned zero weight, no credal state would be more accurate than any other-total trivialization. So some λ-assignments have to be positive. Requiring that the λ-assignments sum to one entails this, and is otherwise a scaling convention. Finally, some positive weight has to be assigned to answers other than the the tautology. Every coherent credal state assigns the tautology its true value, so accuracy with respect to the tautology never sets credal states apart. If the tautology hogged all the weight then again total trivialization would ensue. Summing this up: Admissibility λ is admissible only if: (i) for all j, λj≥0; (ii) ; and (iii) λTaut<1.
This is a necessary condition on admissible λs. Further constraints will be in order depending on the nature of the λ-weighting at issue. This initially plausible looking Core (Truth Directedness, Symmetry, Boundedness, Additivity, and Admissibility) leaves open a large pool of local and global inaccuracy functions.
Satisfying the Core core isn't a sufficient condition for D to count as a legitimate measure of accuracy. Neither does it constitute a set of conditions sufficient to underwrite an accuracy argument for probabilism. As noted, absolute difference, α 1 satisfies the Core, but it doesn't underwrite a dominance argument for probabilism. Further desiderata are needed, and several have been proposed, including Extensionality, Convexity and Propriety. One prominent accuracy measure that satisfies the Core, along with these other features, is the quadratic measure: α 2 . Plugging α 2 into Additivity we get the Brier measures. Let Brier be the thesis that some member of this class is an adequate measure of accuracy.
Brier
There is an admissible λ such that is a legitimate measure of inaccuracy. .
Simple Brier is the special case in which the λ-coefficients are equal (λ equal ). expected inaccuracy. Suppose P is not self-recommending. Perhaps this is because P estimates the inaccuracy of some rival state Q to be less than that of P. If one were in state P then P recommends that to minimize inaccuracy one switch to Q straight away without benefit of additional evidence. Call such a P self-undermining. At first blush there is something very odd about a self-undermining credal state. This suggests the following constraint on accuracy:
Weak Propriety
For every P and Q, .
Suppose P is neither self-recommending nor self-undermining. P estimates its own inaccuracy to be no greater than that of any rival, but it does put some rivals on an equal footing. Call such states self-deprecating. Self-deprecating states are not as bad as self-undermining states, but they still seem odd. This suggests:
Strict Propriety
For every P and Q≠P, . Proximity requires is that the step from P ¬T to P C does not increase inaccuracy. The generalization of Substitution for credal states is also compelling. Suppose P(Cj)>0 and P(Ck)=0. Let P k/j be just like P except that P k/j (Cj)=0 and P k/j (Ck)=P(Cj).
Substitution for Credal States
Ck≈ i Cj then , and if Ck≻ i Cj then .
Strict Proximity for credal states is the combination of Substitution and Weak Proximity.
In I W , let P i be the flat state that assigns an equal non-zero credence to each cell compatible with Ai and 0 to the rest. A2≈ 1 A3 and A1≻ 1 A4. By Substitution it follows that P5≈ 1 P6 and P5≻ 1 P10.
A special case of Substitution involves opinionated states. Let P j assign 1 to Cj. If Cj and Ck are equally accurate then, by Substitution, so too are the opinionated states, P j and P k (=(P j ) k/j ). If Ck is more accurate than Cj then P k is more accurate than P j .
Opinionation
If Ck≈ i Cj then and if Ck≻ i Cj then .
Joyce [2009] , pp. 276-8, gives a recipe for generating proper measures but they do not all satisfy the 22 core.
Since A2≈ 1 A3 and A1≻ 1 A4, Opinionation yields P 2 ≈ 1 P 3 and P 1 ≻ 1 P 4 .
Extensionality
In his [1998] Joyce introduces Extensionality as a possible condition on an accuracy measure.
The "facts" which a person's partial beliefs must "fit" are exhausted by the truth-values of the propositions believed, and the only aspect of her opinions that matter is their strengths. 23 Joyce sees that propositional accuracy might well conflict with Extensionality:
A[n] objection to Extensionality is that it does not take verisimilitude into account. Here is how the complaint might go:
Copernicus (let us suppose) was exactly as confident that the earth's orbit is circular as Kepler was that it is elliptical. However, both were wrong since the gravitational attraction of the moon and the other planets causes the earth to deviate slightly from its largely elliptical path. Extensionality rates the two thinkers as equally inaccurate since both believed a falsehood to the same high degree. Still Kepler was obviously nearer the mark, which suggests that evaluations of accuracy must be sensitive not only to the truthvalues of the propositions involved, but also to how close false propositions come to being true. 24 Joyce's reply:
An agent who strongly believes that the earth's orbit is elliptical will also strongly believe many more truths than a person who believes that it is circular (e.g., that the average distance from the earth to the sun is different in different seasons). This means that the overall effect of Kepler's inaccurate belief was to improve the extensional accuracy of his system of beliefs as a whole. …I suspect that most intuitions about falsehoods being "close to the truth" can be explained in this way, and that they therefore pose no real threat to Extensionality.
If Joyce were right then an equal distribution of λ-weights would capture the desired ranking and Extensionality would be preserved. We can test this with opinionated states in the weather framework. In Table 4 , λ equal assigns equal weights to all fifteen answers. Any two false complete answers Cj and Ck entail the same number of true answers (8) and the same number of false answers (7), and as a result the associated opinionated states end up with the same score. This is a quantitative version of the problem which crippled Popper's qualitative account, and it Joyce [1998] Table 4 violates Opinionation
Since λ equal assigns equal weights, and P 4 and P 2 both deliver 8 answers with maximal inaccuracy and 7 answers with minimal inaccuracy, we have . This suggest the EU theorist needs to abandon equal weights. Some answers must count more than others in overall accuracy. If so the distances between complete answers might be packed into a suitable selection of λ. This idea is floated in Joyce [2009] , and by Greaves and Wallace 2007. The latter explicitly advocate distributing λ-weights unequally in order to capture truthlikeness:
….often, we will want to judge one credence distribution as epistemically better than another even when both assign the same degree of belief to the true state, on the grounds that the first concentrates its remaining credence among (false) states that are closer to the truth than does the second. Our sample schema [viz Brier] takes account of the value of verisimilitude, by a judicious choice of the coefficients λ: we simply assign high λ when A is a set of 'close' states. 26 Note that the judgement endorsed in the first sentence of the paragraph hints strongly at Strict Proximity. Greaves and Wallace intimate that such considerations can be captured by assigning a high λ-value to "a set of 'close' states". They don't spell what they mean by "a set of 'close' states", and there are two possible interpretations On the first interpretation a set of 'close' states is a set of cells close to the true cell. That is, -the weight assigned to Aj when Ci is true-depends on how close Aj is to Ci. could be simply identified with the truthlikeness of Aj given Ci. More liberally, could be any strictly increasing function of truthlikeness. It would be surprising if there were no such likenesssensitive world-dependent λ-weightings compatible with Proximity. There are, however, a couple of problems with this world-dependent interpretation. The authors call the λs "constant coefficients". A natural interpretation of this is that λj does not vary with the location of the true cell. Rather, it is a world-independent affair. This reading is bolstered by a sketch of a proof of the Propriety of the Brier measures (in their footnote 9). The proof is valid only if the λ-coefficients are world-independent. If the the λ-weights are world independent and the local inaccuracy function d is weakly/strictly proper, then the so too is the The main problem with the world-independent interpretation is that it is not immediately obvious what is supposed to count as a set of 'close' states. There is, however, one rather plausible construal. Suppose we assign high λ-coefficients to those answers in which the cells are close, not to the true cell, but to one another. We can flesh out this idea using the notion of a convex region. Suppose we have a notion of betweenness on cells. A convex set of cells is one 27 that contains all the cells located between any two cells in the set. For example: A5 = h = {A1, A2} and A6 = r = {A1, A3} are both convex since A1 is close to A2, and A1 is close to A3 (they are both adjacent pairs); whereas and A7 = h≡r = {A1, A4} and A8 = ¬h≡r = {A2, A3} are not, since A1 is maximally distant from A4, as A2 is from A3. One λ-weighting compatible with this interpretation of 'close' states (λ convex ) assigns equal weights to all the convex regions of the weather space and zero weight to the non-convex regions. Another (λ atomic ) assigns equal weights to certain special convex regions-namely, the atomic propositions and their negations, and zero to the non-atomic states. Table 5 gives the local and global inaccuracies using λ convex and λ atomic for weights, and a d satisfying the Core. , .
Thus with appropriate world-independent λ-weightings, the Core yields Opinioniation. The question now is whether, with admissible λ-weightings, we can recover the intuitively correct accuracy ordering on credal states generally, not just the opinionated states. To settle that we first have to specify which λ-weightings are admissible on each of the two interpretations. 28
The notion of convexity has proved very rich in recent work in property theory (Gärdenfors [2000] ). See Oddie
27
[1987] for an earlier application of convexity in the TL program that shows the connection between convex states and atomic states. Interestingly Popper also intimated that convexity might provide an escape hatch for his beleaguered qualitative account of truthlikeness.
In an early draft I ignored world-dependent weightings, in part because one of the co-authors told me that this is 28 what they had had in mind. An anonymous referee persuaded me that whatever the authors' intention worlddependent assignments are a more promising way to go to accommodate Proximity.
Admissible Weightings
On the world-dependent interpretation, an admissible λ-assignment is an increasing function of accuracy. A local error-like underestimating the probability of a true proposition-is thus more egregious the closer A is to the true cell On the world-independent construal, a λ-assignment can assign different weights, subject to the constraint that the assignment not assign different weights to propositions with the same world-independent distance structure. Distance structure (like convexity) is an internal feature of a proposition which depends only the relationships among the cells of the proposition and their relationships to cells outside the proposition. Looking at figure 1, for example, it is clear that the edges of the square all share the same distance structure, as do the cells and the negations of the cells.To be maximally charitable to the EU program, we will allow as WI-admissible all assignments that supervene on distance structure. First, we define having the same distance structure: A and B over I with distance function δ have the same distance structure (A≈δB) if and only there is an automorphism f on <I, δ> such that f(A)=B. 30 
WI-Admissibility λ is WI-admissible if and only if it is admissible, and
for all Aj and Ak, if Aj ≈δ Ak then λj = λk.
The ≈δ-equivalence classes in I W under the city block measure are:
G1
Complete answers: A1, A2, A3, A4; G2 Atomic propositions and their negations: A5, A6, A9, A10; G3 Biconditionals of atomic propositions and their negations: A7, A8; G4
Negations of complete answers: A11, A12, A13, A14.
G5
The tautology: A15.
Propositions in G1, G2, G5 are all convex, those in G3 and G4 are not. Propositions in G2 are atomic, those in the other classes are not. Hence both convexity and atomicity supervene on distance structure, as do the associated equal weightings of the convex and the atomic propositions-λ convex and λ atomic . Different metrics typically produce different equivalence classes. For example, suppose all cells are equidistant from one another (viz. a miss is as good
I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee.
29
An analogous definition works for inquiries which have an accuracy ordering on the cells but no metric.
30
as a mile). Then answers belong to the same equivalence class just in case they have the same number of cells (i.e. G2 and G3 combine into a single equivalence class). Is WI-admissibility too restrictive? For example, it has been suggested that answers might count more toward accuracy the more informative they are. Or there may be a reason to assign 31 different weights to, say, different atomic propositions.
A proposition is stronger the more cells it rules out. If A ≈ δ B then A and B rule out the same number of cells. Thus strength, like atomicity and convexity, supervenes on distance structure, so there are WI-admissible λs that favor strength, as well as those that favor weakness, or any combination of factors that supervene on distance structure.
Differences in the weights of atomic propositions are also possible but go hand in hand with asymmetries in distance structure. Suppose temperature is twice as important as precipitation in accuracy assessments. It should receive double the λ-weighting. In that case the distance of ¬h∧r from h∧r should be double the distance of h∧¬r from h∧r. h and r would thus have different distance structures in such a space.
Propriety Violates Proximity
We will use the example in Table 6 . A1 is true. P i is the flat Ai-state. P 1 , P 2 , and P 4 are opinionated states, and P 1 is the target. P 8 assigns 1/2 to each of A2 and A3. P 9 assigns 1/2 to each of A2 and A4. P 14 assigns 1/3 to each of A2, A3 and A4. d is any local inaccuracy function satisfying the Core. Rows 1-5 specify the probabilities assigned by the five credal states, and 6-9 specify the local inaccuracies of the false credal states. (i) .
(ii) .
(iii) .
(iv) . Table 6 Example other than pure accuracy, e.g., some will require us to weight propositions by their informativeness". By "pure accuracy" Joyce means the closeness of a probability assignment to the actual truth value. It would of course beg the question to assume that that is all there is to genuine accuracy. The following lemma will prove useful.
Lemma For any weakly proper local accuracy function d that satisfies the core, i<1/2.
If d is weakly proper: for all p,q: pd(p,1)
for all q, 1/2d(1/2,1) + 1/2d(1/2,0) ≤ 1/2d(q,1) + 1/2d(q,0). p,0) . p,0) . 
By WI-Admissibility: λ1=λ2=λ3=λ4; λ5=λ6=λ9=λ10; λ7=λ8; λ11=λ12=λ13=λ14.
From ( 
From (iii) and (c):
.
By Admissibility and λ15< 1. From the I W model we have: A2≈ 1 A3 and A1≻ 1 A4.
By WD-Admissibility, (a): λ2=λ3; λ5=λ6; λ9=λ10; λ12=λ13.
Weak Proximity:
(1−2i)λ2
For all j: λj ≥0. The absolute difference measure α 1 is weakly convex and does not underwrite the required dominance argument. So strict convexity is too strong for a legitimate inaccuracy measure (it is incompatible with Weak Proximity), while weak convexity is too weak (it cannot underwrite the vindication of probabilism). Of course, even though the weak convexity of inaccuracy will not serve this purpose, it may nevertheless be a feature that a genuine measure of accuracy should possess. The weak convexity of D λ , even in conjunction with the Core, poses no threat to Weak Proximity or Substitution. It is thus compatible with Strict Proximity.
11.2
Reject boundedness Perhaps we can have both Proximity and Propriety by revising the Core. Truth Directedness is indispensable to the EU approach. Symmetry is unimpeachable for probabilistic credal states. That leaves Boundedness and Additivity. 34 Let d be unbounded: d(1,0)=d(0,1)=∞. Suppose P 1 is the target state let P be any other opinionated state (P(A1)=0).
Let λ be WD-admissible. Then λ1>λj for all j≠1, so λ1>0. P(A1)=0, P 1 (A1)=1, and so . All false opinionated states are thus equally inaccurate (violating Opinionation and hence Substitution which entails it) and no more accurate than any non-opinionated state (violating Strong Proximity). Let λ be WI-admissible. There are four possibilities which are exhaustive, but not necessarily exclusive: In (i)-(iii) Substitution and Strong Proximity are violated Suppose none of (i)-(iii) holds. Then:
(iv) A7 (=A1∨A4) and A8 (=A2∨A3) alone have positive and equal λ-weight (=1/2). A7 and A8 alone contribute to inaccuracy. Note: P 1 (A7)=1 and P 1 (A8)=0.
(a) P 4 (A7)=1; P 4 (A8)=0. So .
By Substitution, contradicting (a) and (b).
By Weak Proximity, , contradicting (b) and (c).
11.3
Reject additivity The last element one might consider jettisoning is Additivity. If P and Q assign the same probability to A then both make the same local error with respect to A and, given Additivity, that common local error makes the same contribution to their global scores. But perhaps other features of P and Q should affect the contribution of that local error-such as what P and Q assign to T. If P(T)>0 and Q(T)=0, then maybe the error over A should against Q more than it does against P. For all I have shown, there may be some non-additive, strictly proper, global inaccuracy measure for credal states that also coheres with Proximity. This possibility has never been suggested, perhaps because EU theorists have not paid any attention to propositional accuracy and in part because the incompatibility of Propriety and Proximity has hitherto gone unnoticed. This avenue may be worth exploring although prospects look far from promising.
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The accuracy of a credal state clearly depends not only on probabilities it assigns to various answers and the actual truth values of those. It also depends on the closeness of cells to the actual cell. Measures that ignore this dimension (like simple Brier and any other measure that obeys Extensionality) cannot deliver fundamental principles of accuracy. This deficit can be mitigated by allowing propositional accuracy a role in determining the accuracy of credal states -either directly (via world-dependent weights that give a greater weight to accurate propositions), or indirectly (via world-independent weights that reflect proximities). But, as the main result shows, no measure satisfying the Core can accommodate both Propriety and Proximity. The search for an adequate measure of the accuracy of credal states is by no means
over, and a serious question mark now hovers over the standard non-pragmatic vindications of probabilism, conditionalization, the Principal Principle and the value of experimenting. Figure 2 The relative accuracy of ¬T and Closesti(¬T) A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6  A7  A8  A9  A10  A11  A12  A13  A14 
